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A CRIMINAL ANTITRUST PROSECUTION OF
BOTH PARTNER AND PARTNERSHIP-THE
ENTITY THEORY AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The fifth amendment provides that no person shall "be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."1
Despite the exalted position of this mandate in the Bill of Rights, the
federal courts have not always given it the fullest possible effect 2 in
cases where an unincorporated business enterprise and its individual
officers are simultaneously prosecuted for violation of federal regula-
tory statutes. Even though the activities of the defendant enterprise
and the defendant officers may have been essentially "unitary" in na-
ture, the individual defendants may still face multiple prosecution, mul-
tiple punishment, or both.' In such cases, the courts have made short
work of the double jeopardy defense and have advanced the following ar-
gument in justification: Congress intends federal regulatory statutes
to have the broadest possible coverage. 4 To this end, Congress ex-
pressly makes such statutes applicable to partnerships and other un-
incorporated associations, as well as to individuals and corporations.
The fact that a particular statute is made applicable to both individuals
and unincorporated associations, so the argument concludes, is clearly
indicative of a congressional intent to punish both an association and
its individual members; the double jeopardy defense is consequently
foreclosed, even though the net result could well be characterized as
judicial imposition of multiple punishment on the individual members.
The courts achieve the twofold objective of insuring broad cover-
age of regulatory statues and foreclosing double jeopardy objections
by interpreting the statutes as a legislative imprimatur for the "enterprise
entity" theory.5 Under this theory, corporations and unincorporated
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. In Ex parte Lange, the Court stated that the pro-
hibition against double jeopardy requires that no man shall "more than once be placed
in peril of legal penalties upon the same accusation." 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173
(1873). This quotation was paraphrased from Chitty's work on criminal law and
indicates that from a historical perspective the purpose of the prohibition was preven-
tion of double punishment. 1 J. CHrrnr, CRnmNAL LAw 452-62 (1894).
2. Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965).
3. Id. at 304. The Supreme Court recently recognized the proportions of the
problem in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 452 (1970) (concurring opinion), where the
Court stated: "Given the tendency of modem criminal legislation to divide the phrases
of a criminal transaction into numerous separate crimes, the opportunities for multiple
prosecutions for an essentially unitary criminal episode are frightening."
4. See text accompanying note 53 infra.
5. For a fuller discussion of the nature of the theory, see Berle, The Theory of
Enterprise Entity, 47 COLuTm. L Rav. 343 (1947).
associations are deemed to possess a legal personality altogether sep-
arate and distinct from that of their individual shareholders, officers
and members. Utilization of the entity theory, it is commonly assumed,
minimizes the likelihood that individual transgressors or combinations
of transgressors will escape a particular statute's regulatory net." For
this reason, the courts have from time to time invoked the enterprise
entity concept in prosecutions under the Sherman Act.'
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that
[E]very person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy [declared by sections 1-7 to be illegal]
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or
by imprisonment not exceeding one year or by both. .... 8
Section 7 of the act provides that: "the word 'person,' or 'persons,'
wherever used [in sections 1-7] shall be deemed to include corpora-
tions and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of ei-
ther the United States [or] the laws of any State ... ," The general
Rules of Construction statute provides that
[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the
context indicates otherwise, . . . the words "person" and "who-
ever" include corporations, companies, associations, firms, part-
nerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as indivi-
duals. 10
In order to insure complete enforcement of the above provisions,
the courts have uniformly held corporations, labor unions, and other
unincorporated associations to be separate entities." Such a result is
desirable insofar as it insures that violators of the Sherman Act do not
go unpunished. " Recently, however, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has used the entity theory to justify a questionable result
in Western Laundry & Linen Rental Co. v. United States.13
In Western, five corporations, one partnership and five individuals
were charged with a "conspiracy to raise, stabilize, and maintain prices
of linen supplies in the Las Vegas, Nevada area; to refrain from solic-
iting one another's customers; and to allocate business. "14 Among
the defendants named in the indictment was Morris Hazan, an indivi-
6. See United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 392 (1921).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647,
§§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 209).
8. Id. § 1 (emphasis added).
9. Id. § 7.
10. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
11. See text accompanying notes 52-53 infra.
12. See text accompanying note 53 inf ra.
13. 424 F.2d 441 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849 (1970).
14. Record, vol. 1, at 58, Western Laundry & Linen Rental Co. v. United States,
424 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1970).
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dual, and Western Laundry & Linen Rental Co., a partnership of which
Hazan was a partner.15 Both of these defendants were convicted on
pleas of nolo contendere. Subsequent to conviction and sentence,
defendant Hazan filed a "Motion to Eliminate and Reduce Sen-
tences."16  The motion was denied. 7  Both on the motion and on the
appeal from its denial, the defendant challenged the constitutionality
of the Government's attempt to punish him first as a partner and next
as an individual. The defendant urged that either the $1000 fine as-
sessed against him or the $25,000 fine assessed against the partnership
be eliminated in order to prevent double punishment for the same
offense.' 8
In his appellate brief the defendant cited no cases holding that
double jeopardy results from a conspiracy conviction of both a defen-
dant partnership as a separate entity and a defendant partner as an
individual. He did attempt to argue by analogy from a case involving
the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment. United States v.
Linen Service Council of New Jersey9 was a proceeding upon mo-
tion in the district court to quash subpoenas duces tecum which had
been served on two partnerships.20 The Government had sought to
require production of partnership records by serving the subpoenas on
the partnerships' principal places of business.2 ' The defendant part-
ners contended that their privilege against self-incrimination should
not be denied by the simple expedient of declaring a partnership a sepa-
rate entity and serving a subpoena at its place of business. The court
agreed, and accordingly held that for the purposes of the self-incrimina-
tion clause a partnership was not a separate entity, and that "[i]f the
government requires the production of the documents referred to in the
subpoenas directed to the partnerships, the individual partners will be
granted immunity . ,,"I Relying on Linen Service, the defendant
in Western contended that since the prohibition of double jeopardy
and privilege against self-incrimination occur in sequence in the text of
15. Id. The single count indictment named "Western Laundry & Linen Rental
Co., a partnership" and Morris A. Hazan, "associated with the company." Id. at 3.
16. Id. at 66. The motion was based on FED. R. CaIM. P. 35 which permits the
court to reduce sentence within 120 days after sentence is imposed.
17. Record, vol. 1, at 72, Western Laundry & Linen Rental Co. v. United States,
424 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1970).
18. Brief for Appellant at 5, Western Laundry & Linen Rental Co. v. United
States, 424 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1970).
19. 141 F. Supp. 511 (D.N.J. 1956).
20. Id. at 511. A subpoena for the production of books, papers, or documents
may be quashed if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. FED. R. CRIM. P.
17(c).
21. 141 F. Supp. at 511. The opinion is abbreviated and a detailed description of
the facts was not given.
22. Id. at 513.
March 1971] CRIINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
the fifth amendment, there must be a relationship between the appli-
cation of both guarantees to partnerships.23 Since the subpoena of a
partnership was held tantamount to a subpoena of the partner, the de-
fendant reasoned, jeopardy of the partnership is likewise tantamount
to jeopardy of the partner.24
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's ruling and thus im-
plicitly rejected the defendant's analogy. 25 A partnership, the court
held, is a separate entity for the purposes of prosecution under the
Sherman Act. Judge Madden, writing for the majority, first considered
whether a partnership is subject to indictment for violation of the
Sherman Act. The express provisions of both the Sherman Act and the
Rules of Construction led the court to conclude that there is "no justi-
fication for reading partnership out of the coverage of the Sherman
Act."26
The court then proceeded to consider the principal issue presented
by the defendant: "Does the U.S. Constitutional proscription against
double jeopardy and double punishment require that the sentence
against [the defendant] be eliminated?"2  Starting from the premise
that no problem of double jeopardy could have arisen had Western
been a corporation, the majority acknowledged that there is not the
same clear distinction, between the interest of the partner qua part-
ner, i.e., his interest in the partnership, and his individual inter-
est, that exists in the corporation-stockholder situation.28
If, under the applicable law, there was any possibility that the defen-
dant might have to pay Western's $25,000 fine, then the court thought
that a double jeopardy problem would arise.29 It would make no dif-
ference whether Western actually failed to pay its fine. But the court
determined that in no event would defendant Hazan have to pay the
fine assessed against Western, for the reason that a conviction of the
partnership entity could only lead to a fine levied on the partnership as-
sets, as distinguished from the personal assets of an individual partner.
Therefore, the court concluded, no problem of double jeopardy ex-
isted. 30  To support its decision, the majority relied heavily on United
23. Brief for Appellant at 15-16, United States v. Linen Serv. Council, 141 F.
Supp. 511 (D.N.J. 1956).
24. Id. at 16.
25. Western Laundry & Linen Rental Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 441, 444
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849 (1970).
26. Id. at 443.
27. Id. at 443-44.
28. Id. at 444.
29. Id.
30. Id. The court apparently concluded that there was no way a partner would be
obligated to pay the claims of the partnership if it were an entity.
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States v. A & P Trucking Co.,3' a case decided by the Supreme Court
in 1958.
Judge Hufstedler specially concurred in the portion of the major-
ity opinion holding that a partnership is subject to indictment for vio-
lations of the Sherman Act, but she dissented from that portion deal-
ing with double jeopardy.8 2  Not only did she question whether A &
P Trucking Co. could "bear the burden the majority places on it,"
but she also thought that the defendants' pleas of nolo contendere were
equivalent to guilty pleas for waiver purposes, and that therefore the
defendant had waived any possible defense of double jeopardy.3 The
third judge on the panel, Judge Ely, concurred in both Judge Madden's
principal opinion and in Judge Hufstedler's concurring opinion con-
cerning the defendant's waiver of the double jeopardy defense. 4
Prior Case Authority Discussed in Western
A careful analysis of Western and A & P Trucking Co. reveals
that a judicial desire to insure the broadest possible coverage of the
regulatory enactments of Congress is at the heart of both decisions.
The defendants in A & P Trucking Co., two partnerships, were
charged, as entitites, in separate indictments with violations of the Mo-
tor Carrier Act,35 which makes it a criminal offense to violate Inter-
state Commerce Commission regulations for the safe transportation in
interstate commerce of "explosives and other dangerous articles."
86
The A & P Trucking Company was alleged to have broken the regula-
tions by transporting chromic acid without the prescribed markings.3 7
The district court dismissed the indictments on the ground that a part-
nership entity could not be found guilty of violating the act. The Su-
preme Court reversed. 8
Section 835 of the act imposes criminal liability on "whoever
knowingly" violates the regulations. It does not define the word "who-
ever."939  The general Rules of Construction provide that in determin-
ing the meaning of any act of Congress, the words "person" and "who-
ever" include partnerships unless the context of a particular act indi-
31. 358 U.S. 121 (1958).
32. 424 F.2d at 445.
33. Id. at 445-46. The fact that waiver was an adequate ground to uphold the
result may be the reason why certiorari was denied.
34. 424 F.2d at 446.
35. 18 U.S.C. §§ 831-37 (1964), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 831-37 (Supp. V,
1970).
36. Id. § 832.
37. United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958).
38. Id.
39. Sections 831-37 are all similar in this respect.
March 1971]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
cates otherwise. 40  The majority in A & P Trucking Co. decided that
the Rules of Construction should guide judicial interpretation of sec-
tion 835.41 Accordingly, they held that a partnership is a legal entity,
distinct from the individual partners, for the purpose of criminal liabil-
ity under the act.42  The court duly noted the common law theory
that a partnership is an aggregate rather than an entity, but dismissed it
with the remark that Congress has power to change the common law.43
In light of the Rules of Construction, the court felt compelled to view
Motor Carrier Act as an express departure from the common law in
this respect. 44  Justice Black dissented, pointing out that at common
law a partnership as an entity could not have scienter. Therefore, he
argued, the explicit inclusion of the word "knowingly" coupled with
the absence of an express definition of "whoever" as embracing part-
nerships was a "context" indicating a congressional intent that the gen-
eral Rules of Construction should not apply.45
It must be emphasized that double jeopardy was not an issue in
A & P Trucking Co. The only question there concerned the proper
construction of the Motor Carrier Act. The issue was framed in
terms of strict construction versus broad construction. Under the
strict construction approach adopted by the dissenters, doubts as to the
proper construction of the act should be resolved in favor of the defen-
dants. Criminal liability should not be imposed, the dissenters
thought, unless Congress expresses a clear and unequivocal intention
that a partnership be prosecuted as an entity. Under the broad con-
struction approach, the Court construed the statute to avoid technical-
ities and maintain consistency in the legislative scheme.46 Although
the former approach may sacrifice uniformity in the law, the latter
may encroach upon a defendant's constitutional rights. The Court
chose the broad approach because it would give full effect to the mani-
fest legislative intent of Congress to provide uniform coverage.
The A & P Trucking Co. decision is probably correct insofar as it
holds that partnerships can be liable as separate entities for violations of
the Motor Carrier Act. The conclusion that Congress intended to
bring partnerships within the purview of the Motor Carrier Act is
strengthened by the definition clause of the code, by the prior applica-
tion of the entity theory to other forms of business, and by the urgent
40. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
41. United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 123 (1958).
42. Id. at 126-27.
43. Id. at 124.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 127-28.
46. Id. at 124, 126.
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policy reasons for extending the coverage of regulations concerning
transportation of explosives.
The question whether a partnership can be liable as a separate en-
tity for violations of the Sherman Act has been directly discussed in
very few cases, one of which, United States v. Brookman Co.,47 was
cited in Western. In that case the federal district court held that the
inclusion of "corporations and associations" within the Sherman Act
definition of "person" brought partnerships within the scope of the
act.
48
Central to the decision in Brookman, and hence to Western, was
the earlier case of United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.49
There the United Mine Workers of America, some of its local officers
and other individuals were charged with a conspiracy to restrain and
monopolize interstate commerce in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.50  The plaintiffs, as receivers for nine other coal
companies, brought the action alleging that the defendant union had
stifled competition by increasing the cost of production of union coal
through unreasonable restrictions and regulations imposed on organized
mines.51 The central issue was whether the union could be sued in
tort as a separate entity without joining all the individual union offi-
cers. Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority, declared that sec-
tions 7 and 8 of the Sherman Act were intended to allow a labor
union with 400,000 members to be sued as a separate entity: "[the]
language [of the act] is very broad, and the words given their natural
signification certainly include labor unions like these.""2 In a much-
quoted passage, the Court continued:
Congress was passing drastic legislation to remedy a threatening
danger to the public welfare, and did not intend that any persons
or combinations of persons should escape [the Sherman Act's]
application. Their thought was especially directed against business
associations and combinations that were unincorporated [who did]
the things forbidden by the act, but they used language broad
enough to include all associations which might violate its provisions
recognized by the statutes of the United States or the States or the
Territories, or foreign countries as lawfully existing. .... 53
Relying in part on this language from Coronado Coal, the fed-
eral district court in Brookman held that a partnership, like a labor
union, should be considered a separate entity for the purposes of pro-
47. 229 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
48. Id. at 864.
49. 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
50. Id. at 346-47.
51. Id. at 34849.
52. Id. at 392.
53. Id.
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secution or suit under the Sherman Act.54 The decision was probably
correct; the language of the Sherman Act is sufficiently broad to war-
rant such an interpretation. 5 However, in neither Brookman not
A & P Trucking Co. was double jeopardy in issue as it was in Western.
Although prior decisions have utilized the entity concept to support the
conclusion that a partnership is subject to prosecution or suit, it does
not necessarily follow that the same concept is equally applicable and
equally dispositive in a double jeopardy situation where both the part-
nership and a partner are prosecuted and punished for what is essen-
tially the same offense. The nature of the entity concept does not re-
quire such a result.56 The entity concept has been used for various
purposes to achieve the desired results, but it must be kept in mind that
the concept is a fiction and overextension may be unwarranted. Before
demonstrating the point in the context of Western, a closer analysis of
the nature of the entity-aggregate distinction is needed.
Partnership and the Entity Theory
Many problems of partnership liability stem from conflicting le-
gal theories concerning the nature of a partnership. Under the so-
called entity theory, the partnership itself is a legal person, separate
and distinct from its individual members. Once this theory is adopted,
many of the principles of corporation law become applicable to part-
nerships.5 Under the aggregate theory, by contrast, a partnership
54. United States v. Brookman Co., 229 F. Supp. 862, 863 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
55. For a detailed review of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, see
Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. Cm. L. REv.
221 (1956). In one passage the author suggests that no express intent to include
partnerships within the scope of the legislation can be found within the legislative his-
tory. "[The Act did] not announce a new principle of law, but [applied] old and well-
recognized principles of the common law to the complicated jurisdiction of our State and
Federal Government. . . ."
On the one hand, it satisfied the public demand for an antitrust law. It pro-
hibited trusts in so many words [and] declared illegal 'every contract, combination in
the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States or with foreign nations ... '
"On the other hand, the Act did not go farther than Congress thought it should ...
Sherman, in his great address, had emphasized that many combinations were desirable.
He was sure that they had been an important cause of America's wealth, and he had no
intention of prohibiting them. It was only 'the unlawful combination, tested by rules
of common law and human experience, that is aimed at by the bill, and not the lawful and
useful combination.'" Id. at 256. As the author points out, these statements indicate
that Congress did not expressly intend to include or exclude partnerships as separate en-
tities. Id. at 257. However, decisions such as Brookman have interpolated and fill the
gaps left by the legislators.
56. See text accompanying notes 59-63 infra.
57. See A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIPS § 3, at 18-29
(1968).
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is deemed to be a legal relationship rather than a legal person; the
individual partners are legal persons, but the partnership itself is not.
The individual partners are considered joint owners of partnership
property, and joint obligors and obligees with respect to claims on be-
half of or against the partnership.
The conflict between the aggregate and entity theories of part-
nership has been a source of considerable confusion.58 Many cases
involving partnerships will turn on which of the two theories is ap-
plied. Some judicial decisions have rested on the entity theory and
others on the aggregate theory. The chameleonic character of legal
theorizing concerning the nature of a partnership is well illustrated by
cases on workmen's compensation and partners' torts.59 In most
states, a partner is considered not to be an "employee" of the partner-
ship and is, therefore, ineligible for workmen's compensation.60  The
reason is that, under the aggregate theory, the partner is an employer
and therefore cannot double as an employee. He does not, it is held,
belong to the working class for whose benefit the compensation acts
were passed. Other states disagree and invoke the entity theory in or-
der to make the partner eligible for workmen's compensation bene-
fits. 61
What is more, the same courts do not always adhere to the same
theory of partnership even in cases arising out of similar fact situations.
If, for example, an injured worker is employed by a partnership but is
not a partner, the court may be content to apply the entity theory if it
58. The confusion was particularly apparent during the drafting of the Uniform
Partnership Act. In Mazzuchelli v. Silberberg, 29 N.J. 15, 148 A.2d 8 (1959), it is re-
ported that: "An early draft by Dean Ames for the Commissioners was based on the
entity theory and accordingly defined a partnership as 'a legal person formed by the as-
sociation of two or more individuals for the purpose of carrying on a business with a
view to profits. . . .' Dean Lewis, however, advocated the view 'that with certain modi-
fications the aggregate or common law theory should be adopted.' As . . . revealed,
[in the Commissioner's Note] the recommendation of Dean Lewis led to the adoption
of a resolution rescinding any prior actions which might limit the committee to 'what
is known as the entity theory.' In 1910 the committee and a group of experts recom-
mended that the act 'be drawn on the aggregate or common law theory with the modifi-
cation that the partners be treated as owners of the partnership property holding by a spe-
cial tenancy which should be called tenancy in partnership. .... ' In harmony with the
decision thus reached, a partnership was defined to be 'an association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit,' as constrasted with the Ames pro-
posal of 'a legal person formed by the association of two or more individuals for the pur-
pose of carrying on a business with a view towards the profits."' Id. at 20, 148 A.2d at
10-11.
59. See A. BROMMERG, supra note 57, at 24 for a more thorough analysis.
60. J. CRANE, PARTnmEsmp 288 (2d ed. 1952).
61. See Note, Partnership: Workmen's Compensation-Partner as Employee, 7
HASTIrNGS L.J 213 (1956).
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will help him recover full damages. 62 On the other hand, the same
court may apply the aggregate theory if that will give the injured worker
access to compensation insurance not otherwise available-as in a
case where each member of a partnership or joint venture has coverage,
but the firm does not. 63
From the foregoing examples three general conclusions may be
drawn. First, the choice between theories depends for the most part
on the desired result: The aggregate theory may be suitable for work-
men's compensation cases, but not for partner's tort cases. Second,
in order to achieve a desired result, one theory may be used in place of
another in successive cases, even though the court has consistently ap-
plied the other theory in similar factual situations. Third, as has been
said in another context:
[I]t is not too important whether a specific result ... is dressed
in the garb of the entity concept, provided the fictional personifica-
tion is confined to the specific result and not used as a premise
for syllogistic thrusts elsewhere.64
Western's Reliance on the Entity Theory
In Western the majority started from the premise that if the defend-
ant Western Laundry had been a corporation, in which the individual
defendant was a stockholder, the corporation and the individual would
have been distinct legal entities.6 5  If both the stockholder and the
corporation had been prosecuted for a single conspiracy in violation of
the Sherman Act, no problem of double jeopardy would have arisen.
As its minor premise, the court relied on the decision in A & P Trucking
Co., where the Supreme Court treated the defendant partnership as an
entity analogous to a corporation, and allowed prosecution of the
partnership under the provisions of the Motor Carrier Act "quite apart
from the participation and knowledge of the partners as individuals." 66
To complete the syllogism, the court concluded that in light of the
authoritative statement by the Supreme Court in A & P Trucking Co.,
in which the issue was "closely comparable," the defendant in Western
had not been put in double jeopardy. The Supreme Court had, "for the
purpose at hand," adopted the entity theory. 67
The flaw in the courts' reasoning is this: Application of the en-
tity theory in a case like A & P Trucking Co., where the issue was the
62. See Carter v. Carter Logging Co., 83 Idaho 50, 357 P.2d 660 (1960).
63. Clawson v. General Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 424, 412 P.2d 597 (1965).
64. Mazzuchelli v. Silberberg, 29 N.J. 15, 21, 148 A.2d 8, 11 (1959).
65. Western Laundry & Linen Rental Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 441, 444
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849 (1970).
66. Id. at 445.
67. Id.
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scope of a regulatory statute, does not compel its application in Wes-
tern, where the issue is double jeopardy. The only principle for which
A & P Trucking Co. stands is that a partnership can "knowingly" vio-
late the Motor Carrier Act even if the individual partners did not parti-
cipate in or have knowledge of the violations. 8 Since no indivi-
duals were indicted nor was the issue of double jeopardy raised, the
A & P Trucking Co. opinion cannot stand for the broad reading given
it by the majority in Western.
Even assuming that the A & P Trucking Co. decision does lend
some inferential support to the Ninth Circuit's holding in Western, it is
far from conclusive on the double jeopardy issue. The double jeopardy
doctrine has its own concepts and rules which the court should have
taken into account in order to arrive at a balanced result.69  The court
did not discuss the double jeopardy rules in any detail, but instead dis-
missed the entire issue with the dictum that "the conviction of the en-
tity can lead only to a fine levied on the firm's assets."7  The rationale
behind this dictum is that the entity theory is a double-edged sword.
While it treats a defendant partnership as separate from individual
partners for prosecution purposes, it protects the co-defendant partners
by limiting fines against the partnership to the assets of the firm.
Reasoning that a fine assessed against the partnership could not af-
fect a partner's personal assets, the Ninth Circuit concluded that there
was no overlap of punishment and hence no double jeopardy was in-
volved.
In summary, it appears that the double jeopardy claim was re-
jected on two grounds. First, the court relied upon A & P Trucking
Co.-a decision which does not deal with the double jeopardy issue.
Second, the court invoked the entity theory-a theory which has been
shown to be susceptible to overextension. Even though the foregoing
discussion suggests weaknesses in Western, it does not demonstrate
that the court's reliance on the entity theory was wholly unjustified.
It merely points out that the court did not find strong support either
in the decisions or in legal theory. It remains to be determined whether
or not application of the entity theory was appropriate in Western.
Criticism of the Use of the Entity Theory in Western
Despite possible weaknesses in the court's authority, there are
strong arguments which support its result. The arguments stem from
three sources: the original broad language of the Sherman Act, the
modem decisions which tend towards tighter enforcement of the act's
68. Id. at 445 (Hufstedler, J., concurring).
69. See note 85 infra.
70. 424 F.2d at 444.
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provisions, and the growing judicial tendency to apply the entity con-
cept to partnerships.
An initial argument might be derived from the legislative history
surrounding adoption of the original language of the act. An in-depth
study of congressional records just prior to adoption of the Sherman
Act indicates that Congress rejected proposals to include or exclude
specific combinations."' Instead, the legislators chose broad lan-
guage in order to make the act more inclusive. On the basis of such
language, a court could reason that Congress intended to allow great
latitude in the application of remedies. Once the court has made this
inference, it may conclude that a partial or total incorporation of the
entity concept into the act merely effects the intent of Congress.
A second argument might be based on the trend of decided cases
since the act's adoption. The history indicates a steady case by case
tightening of enforcement. Early decisions were concerned with the
large corporate monopolies and cartels which developed at the end of
the 19th century. 2  Later cases involved labor unions,a unincor-
porated associations,74 and other small business forms. Since the de-
cisions indicate an increasing tendency to apply the Sherman Act to
small businesses, a court could argue that a liberal application of rem-
edies is merely coincident with that trend. Without a parallel broad-
ening of the remedial provisions, much of the "bite" of the act would
be lost.
A third possible argument is that the theory of partnership has
undergone a shift from an aggregate to an entity analysis. At the time
of the passage of the Sherman Act, partnerships were for the most
part looked upon as an aggregate. 7 There was probably little thought
in the minds of the legislators that partnerships would come to be con-
sidered entitites separate from the individual partners. However, the
Uniform Partnership Act has produced a shift in theory; for many pur-
poses a partnership is now treated as an entity.76 For instance, al-
though the aggregate theory is spelled out for joint and several liabil-
ity provisions,77 notions of an entity concept permeate the act in five
other critical areas.78 From this shift in theory, a court could argue
71. See note 55 supra.
72. E.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1896);
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
73. United Mine Worker v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1921).
74. United States v. Greater New York Live Poultry Chamber of Commerce, 30
F.2d 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
75. A. BROMBERG, supra note 57, at 16.
76. 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 7.
77. Id. § 15.
78. Id. §§ 8, 10 (property); §§ 40(h), (i), 36(4) (creditors' rights); § 9 (re-
sponsibility); §§ 18, 38(1) (internal financial relations); §§ 21-22 (continuity).
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that the modem view of partnership permits application of the entity
theory in Sherman Act prosecutions.
The above lines of argument, although persuasive, are not con-
clusive. Neither the legislative history nor the decisions indicate that
a partner should be subjected to a double penalty for having restrained
trade in the operation of his partnership business. Even assuming
double prosecution is justified, this does not mean that a court is war-
ranted in imposing penalites which force an individual to pay two fines.
Quite to the contrary, the decisions discussing the entity concept indi-
cate that the theory will only be applied when the facts indicate a sub-
stantial distinction between the interests of the individuals and those
of the business form.79 Thus, in the case of a corporation, where the
financial interests of the officers are separate from those of the share-
holders, the courts are disposed to apply the entity theory to ensure that
the act is fully implemented8 0 Likewise, in the case of labor unions,
where financial assets come from union members and are separable
from the financial interests of the union leaders, the courts could also
apply the entity concept. But there appears to be no case, outside of
Western, where a court has applied the entity concept to punish both
the individuals and their business organization where there is a substan-
tial identity of interests. The absence of decisions applying the entity
concept to small businesses may not mean that its application in all
such cases is unwarranted, but it may be indicative of the circumstances
in which courts consider the entity concept appropriate.
It is submitted that the degree to which the interests of the in-
dividual and those of the business form are separate determines
whether the entity theory is appropriate within a particular context.
If the structural and functional organization of the particular business
form indicates that there is no substantial identity of interests, then the
use of the entity theory is appropriate. Conversely, if the court finds a
substantial identity of financial interests, application of the entity
theory is not appropriate.
The point is well illustrated in the case of a labor union. Struc-
turally and functionally a labor union is an institution which involves
more than private interests. It has been a developing institution, and
with its tremendous growth in importance and power, it has come to
be more akin to the corporation than to any other business form.
Partnerships, on the other hand, are not structurally and functionally
approximate to corporations in most instances. Where they are, the
79. Williams v. Hartshorn, 296 N.Y. 49, 69 N.E.2d 557 (1946) (two-man partner-
ship); Carr v. Northern Pac. Beneficial Ass'n, 128 Wash. 40, 221 P. 979 (1924) (un-
incorporated association).
80. United States v. Atlantic Comm'n Co., 45 F. Supp. 187 (E.D.N.C. 1942).
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entity theory may be appropriate. Thus in the case of a large partner-
ship, it may be that the identity of financial interest is slight, that
structurally and functionally the partnership is akin to the corporation,
and that therefore the entity theory is appropriately applied.
In the Western decision there is no indication that the court
examined the Western Laundry partnership to see if the entity theory
was appropriate in light of the financial relationship between the de-
fendant and the firm. Instead, the court categorically classified the
partnership as an entity for the purposes of double jeopardy. This
approach is not consonant with the entity theory as that theory has been
used by the courts. It is suggested that use of the theory in this way
prevents the court from critically examining the structual and functional
organization of the firm, and the relationship between the financial in-
terest of the partner and that of the partnership. Although sufficient
facts cannot be gathered from the court record to completely dis-
credit the entity analysis, the facts do indicate that assets involved
did not exceed $50,000, that only a few partners were involved, and
that there was probably a substantial identity of interests between
the partners' assets and those of the firm."' For this reason it seems
to follow that Western Laundry was inappropriately classified as a
separate entity, and that application of the aggregate theory was in or-
der. Under the assumption that the entity theory was incorrectly ap-
plied by the court in Western, the remainder of this Note will analyze
the double jeopardy considerations which should have been applied
to the Western situation.
Disregard of Double Jeopardy Rules
Multiple Punishment
Multiple punishment for the same offense was constitutionally
prohibited because the framers feared that judges might otherwise be
inclined to impose double punishment for a single legislatively de-
fined offense.82 The apprehension is far from groundless even today,
and the prohibition continues to prevent prosecutors and courts from
81. Record, vol. 1, at 7, Western Laundry & Linen Rental Co. v. United States,
424 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1970).
82. That the framers were equally interested in preventing punishment is ex-
pressed in Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). "[W]e do not doubt that
the Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished
for the same offense as from being twice tried for it." Id. at 173. It has been suggested
that substantive jeopardy is a limit on the discretion of the courts and prosecutors and
was historically developed for that purpose. Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J.
262, 302-08 (1965). This proposition seems well supported by the court's historical view
of double jeopardy in Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168, 170-71, 173 (1873).
See also Ashe v. Swenson, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1201 (1970).
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imposing multiple punishments for the same offense.83  As is made
clear by the case law on double jeopardy, the rules barring multiple
punishment turn on what is meant by "the same offense."' 84  If
this phrase meant two offenses identical in law and fact, double jeop-
ardy would be a relatively simple matter. But most courts sense that
the policy behind the prohibition of double jeopardy embraces closely
related or overlapping offenses as well. This insight has led to the
formulation of various offense-defining tests85 which determine, with
more or less precision, the limits of multiple punishment.
In the federal system the offense-defining test applied to prevent
multiple punishment in a single trial for several offenses is the "same
evidence" or "distinct fact" test.88 Under this test, if each offense re-
quires proof of an additional fact not required by any of the others,
then the defendant may be convicted of all offenses charged.8 7 In
Western the requirements of the distinct fact test would have been
satisfied if the count against the partnership involved a different fact
than the count against the partner. This does not mean, as might be sug-
gested, that a mere naming of partnership would be a different fact so
as to satisfy the test. The test requires different evidential facts, not
fictions or conclusions of law created by the court. For instance, if at
one time a partner had conspired not as an agent of the partnership but
83. See, e.g., United States v. Universal CIT Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952),
where the defendant was charged on a 32 count indictment for violation of three statu-
tory provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, but the court refused to find 32 distinct
offenses.
84. See Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 267 (1965).
85. Basically, two approaches have been used in defining the distinct offense:
the evidentiary and the behavioral. The evidentiary approach has three variations.
Required evidence tests hold that offenses are the same if elements of both offenses are
sufficiently similar. See United States v. Brimsdon, 23 F. Supp. 510 (W.D. Mo. 1938).
Alleged evidence tests hold that offenses are the same if there is sufficient similarity be-
tween the evidence presented. Columbia v. Buckley, 128 F.2d 17 (10th Cir. 1942). An
examination of the above cases reveals that the alleged evidence test falls somewhere
between the required and actual evidence tests discussed above. If the allegations are ex-
amined with a view to the essential facts it is much like the elements test. If, however,
the evidential allegations are considered, it resembles the actual evidence test. The be-
havioral approach directs its attention to the defendant's conduct rather than the prose-
cutor's evidence. Likewise, it contains three variations: the act, transaction or intent
tests. Compare Worley v. State, 42 Okla. Crim. 240, 275 P. 399 (1929), with Crumley
v. City of Atlanta, 68 Ga. App. 69, 22 S.E.2d 181 (1922), and United States v. Adams,
281 U.S. 202 (1930).
86. From the decisions it superficially appears that there are three tests: the "dis-
tinct elements" test, the "same evidence" and the "distinct fact" test. However, a close
analysis reveals that there is probably little difference among these tests. Compare
Harris v. United States, 359 U.S. 19 (1959), with Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299 (1932), and Gravieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911).
87. Harris v. United States, 359 U.S. 19, 23 (1959).
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solely in his capacity as an individual, this itself would be a fact suf-
ficiently distinct to allow prosecution and punishment of both the part-
nership and the individual. If, on the other hand, each and every act
of conspiracy which the individual defendant committed was in fact
committed in his capacity as an agent of his own partnership, then there
would be no distinct fact and the double jeopardy claim should be
sustained. Since the defendants pleaded nolo contendere, the record
reflected no evidence on which to apply the distinct fact test. But
from the similarity of the indictments alone, it seems fair to infer that
Western presents a case within the ban of double jeopardy- 8
Why did the court in Western disregard the distinct fact rule and
reject the defendant's double jeopardy claim? The court apparently
considered the double jeopardy rules inapplicable not only in cases
where a governing statue clearly and unmistakably manifests a congres-
sional intent to impose multiple punishment, but also in a case like
Western, where the governing statute, though ambiguous, could argu-
ably be interpreted by a court as manifesting such an intent.
As one commentator has noted, the "primary purpose of Double
Jeopardy is to limit the discretion of the courts and prosecutors and
not the legislature."8' 9 The double jeopardy clause does not limit the
power of Congress to define offenses and the punishments which will
attach.90 If the Sherman Act contained some such explicit state-
ment as: "A partner shall be punished both in his capacity as an in-
dividual and in his capacity as an agent of the partnership," then un-
questionably no double jeopardy problem would arise. Double jeop-
ardy does not apply when the legislature explicitly permits multiple
punishment, for then the court has no discretion to cumulate punish-
ment; it merely applies the law as written. It is only in the gray area
where the legislature's will is not explicit that the double jeopardy
rules may operate to limit the courts' power to cumulate punishment.
Unfortuntately, the courts, fearing interference with the legislative
will, have gone to great lengths to find a congressional intent to cumu-
late punishment.91 But once the court moves from the situation
where an explicit intent to punish cumulatively is apparent on the
face of the statute to a situation where the statute is either ambiguous
or altogether silent on the point, then the court's imposition of cumu-
lative punishment may amount to that very exercise of discretionary
88. See notes 15-16 supra.
89. Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 302 (1965).
90. See the discussion written by Justice Frankfurter in the Court's opinion in
United States v. Gore, 357 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1958). This statement is, of course, sub-
ject to qualification if other constitutional provisions, e.g., cruel and unusual punish-
ment, are violated.
91. See Carlson v. United States, 274 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1960).
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judicial judgment which the double jeopardy clause was designed to
forbid.
Legislative Mandate or Judicial Discretion-United States v. Gore
"Explicitness" of statutory language-and hence of legislative
intent-is something that more often than not admits of varying de-
grees and occasions differences of opinion among reasonable interpret-
ers. Thus in many cases where a court invokes statutory language and
legislative intent to justify its imposition of more than one punishment
for different offenses arising out of the same transaction, it is rather
difficult to say whether the court has acted constitutionally in obedience
to an explicit legislative command, or has unconstitutionally cumu-
lated punishment in its own discretion.
The difficulty was well illustrated in United States v. Gore, 2 a
1958 Supreme Court decision. In Gore the defendant was con-
victed on six counts for violating three different sections of federal
narcotics law by a single sale of narcotics on each of two different
days.9" He was sentenced to three consecutive 5-year terms for
each day's sale. The evidence clearly showed that although the dis-
tinct fact test was met, each day's sale was a single transaction giv-
ing rise to the three offenses chargedY4 The defendant had only made
two sales, but was charged with two counts of a sale not "in pur-
suance of a written order" of a person to whom the drugs were sold,95
two counts of a sale not "in the original stamped package," 96 and two
counts of concealment and sale of narcotics "knowing the same to
have been imported or brought into the United States contrary to
law."9 7 There was no question as to the legality of the multiple con-
victions, for the violations were defined by Congress as separate of-
fenses. The crucial issue was the legality of the cumulative sen-
tences. The defendant claimed that for all three counts only one sen-
tence could be imposed and moved to eliminate and reduce sen-
tences."8 The motion was denied by the trial court; the court of ap-
peals affirmed.
In the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that Congress had
enacted the three statutory provisions in furtherance of a single pur-
92. 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
93. The first three counts were derived from a sale of 20 capsules of heroin and
3 of cocaine; the last three were derived from a sale of 35 capsules of heroin. Id.
at 387.
94. Id.
95. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4705(a).
96. Id. § 4704(a).
97. 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964) (originally enacted as Narcotics Drugs Import &
Export Act, 35 Stat. 614 (1909).
98. 357 U.S. at 388.
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pose-to outlaw the sale of narcotics. 9  Since the defendant had made
only one transaction on each of the days involved, he contended that
there could be only one punishment for each day's activities. A di-
vided court held that Congress intended to impose three consecutive 5-
year sentences in such a situation. Therefore such a result did not
offend the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 100 Jus-
tice Frankfurter explained that Congress could have enacted the fol-
lowing single statute instead of the three provisions:
Anyone who sells drugs except from the original stamped package
and who sells such drugs not in pursuance of a written order of the
person to whom the drug is sold, and who does so by way of facili-
tating the concealment and sale of drugs knowing the same to have
been unlawfully imported, shall be sentenced to not less than fif-
teen years' imprisonment. Provided, however, That if he makes
such sale in pursuance of a written order of the person to whom
the drug is sold, he shall be sentenced to only ten years' imprison-
ment: And Provided further, That if he sells such drugs in pur-
suance of a written order and from a stamped package, he shall
be sentenced to only five years' imprisonment. 101
Justice Frankfurter then asked, "Is it conceivable that such a statute
would not be within the power of Congress?"' 1 2 The obvious nega-
tive answer to this rhetorical question suggests that the Court consid-
ered a single 15-year sentence imposed under the hypothetical statute
as substantially equivalent to the situation in Gore, where three consec-
utive 5-year sentences were imposed for a single transaction in which
the defendant violated all of the three existing provisions. And since
the single sentence under the hypothetical statute would have been con-
stitutionally permissible, the Court concluded, the three consecutive
sentences were likewise permissible. Chief Justice Warren dissented,
saying:
Where the legislature has failed to make its intention manifest [in
relation to punishment], courts should proceed cautiously, remain-
ing sensitive to the interests of defendant and society alike. All rele-
vant criteria must be considered and the most useful aid will be of-
ten common sense. . . . [O]n the basis of . . . the statutes in-
volved . . . the present purpose [of the narcotics laws] is to make
sure the prosecutor has three avenues by which to prosecute, and
not to authorize three cumulative punishments for the defendant
who consumates a single sale.1 3
The contrasting views of the majority and the dissenters on what
intent may be attributed to Congress points up the difficulty in double
99. Id. at 390.
100. Id. at 391, 393. The decision was 5-4 with Justices Warren, Brennan, and
Douglas dissenting. Justice Black concurred in Justice Douglas's dissent.
101. Id. at 392-93.
102. Id. at 393.
103. Id. at 394.
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jeopardy situations. If Justice Frankfurter's hypothetical single stat-
ute were indeed the equivalent of the three statutes involved in Gore,
then the congressional intent to impose multiple punishment is expli-
cit and double jeopardy cannot operate. But where such a legislative
intent is not explicit, as Chief Justice Warren contended it was not in
Gore, it would appear that the Court and not Congress is commanding
cumulative punishment. In the former situation the Court is merely
obeying the will of Congress; in the latter the Court is exercising its
own arbitrary discretion to cumulate punishment. Such an exercise
of judicial discretion is precisely what the framers of the Constitution
intended the double jeopardy clause to prevent. In a case like Gore,
where no explicit congressional intent to cumulate punishment appears
either on the face of the statutes or in the legislative history, one is in-
clined to conclude that sheer judicial timidity-a fear of "limiting the
penological power of [Congress]" -impels the court to discover an ex-
plicit intent and thereby escape double jeopardy problems. L0 4
Even if we assume the majority was correct in Gore, the case may
be distinguishable from Western. First of all, in Gore the defendant
was convicted under three separate statutes. It seems reasonable to
infer that Congress would have said something had it intended that a
person who in one transaction violates all three statutes should receive
a unitary noncumulative punishment. Secondly, the three acts of Con-
gress involved in Gore, enacted at different times during the last 50
years, "constitute a network of provisions, steadily tightened and en-
larged, for grappling with a powerful, subtle, elusive enemy"'10 5-that
is, the narcotics trade. Neither of these factors was present in West-
ern. Western involved only one statute, the Sherman Act. Although
a partnership may definitely be convicted as an entity for violations of
that act, it is by no means clear that Congress intended punishment of
both the partnership entity and its individual members for the same
acts committed at the same time. There is nothing in the language or
legislative history that clearly mandates such a result. And the Gore
decision shows by negative implication that the double jeopardy rules
should apply in a case where congressional intent to impose multiple
punishment is unclear.
From the foregoing is derived the second major criticism of West-
ern. This criticism is that the court failed to face squarely the double
jeopardy issue. Had the Ninth Circut properly focused on this issue,
two factors would have determined its result.
The first factor is the congressional intent to punish cumulatively.
If the intent is explicit, then double jeopardy may not operate. If
104. Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE LJ. 262, 303 (1965).
105. 357 U.S. at 390.
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there is no such explicit intent to impose multiple punishment on the de-
fendant, then the double jeopardy issue may arise. The Supreme
Court has never spoken directly to this point in antitrust prosecutions
of partnerships. The Court has held, however, that where certain
forms of businesses are subject to criminal sanctions, the individuals
who comprise them may also be punished in order to effectuate the
broad coverage intended by Congress.' However, as the size of the
business involved decreases, the courts will undoubtedly be less dis-
posed to discover a congressional intent to impose multiple punishment.
In the case of a small partnership, there is a serious question of whether
multiple punishment was intended at all. It is submitted that crimi-
nal prosecutions of partnerships are one class of cases where a con-
gressional intent to impose multiple punishment is not explicit, and
that the court in Western was therefore cumulating punishment. It is
just this type of arbitrary judicial action that the double jeopardy
guarantee prohibits, and the Ninth Circuit should have employed it to
protect the defendant's constitutional right.
The second factor which the court would have considered would
be the "distinct fact" test. If the case had fallen within this offense-
defining test, double jeopardy would not have been an issue.
In summary, Western may be criticized for two important reasons.
First, it was unjustifiable for the Court to rely solely on the entity
theory and its application in A & P Trucking Co. to reach the conclu-
sion that there was no validity to the double jeopardy claim. Secondly,
the failure to focus on the double jeopardy issue introduced imbal-
ance into the delicate relationship between legislative intent and the
double jeopardy bar to multiple punishment.
The Rule of Lenity
It is apparent that double jeopardy has been insufficient to pre-
vent courts from rendering harsh and arbitrary decisions when legisla-
tive enactments do not explicitly provide for multiple punishment in
a given situation. Gore and Western both illustrate that a court can
easily justify a result by hiding behind this legislative inexactness. To
help control such arbitrary judicial discretion, the Supreme Court has
devised a "rule of lenity" to be applied in the single statute case. 10 7
Under this rule, doubts as to legislative intent should be resolved
against the creation of multiple units of conviction. The rule was first
applied in Bell v. United States,10 8 which construed the Mann Act to
106. Cf. Pankrantz Lumber Co. v. United States, 50 F.2d 174 (9th Cir. 1931) (cor-
poration). But see United States v. Caroll, 144 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
107. Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958).
108. 349 U.S. 81 (1955).
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create only one unit of conviction even when more than one woman
is transported in interstate commerce. Later, in Ladner v. United
States,09 the Court used the rule of lenity to prohibit multiple punish-
ment of a defendant who had injured two officers with one blast from
a shotgun. The Court observed that the statute could be read to mean
that "there [were] as many "assaults" committed as there [were] offi-
cers affected."110 Neither the wording of the statute nor its legislative
history pointed clearly to a definite meaning. Under these circum-
stances the Court applied the rule of lenity and adopted the more leni-
ent meaning. The Court said:
[W]hen choice has to be made between two readings of what con-
duct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose
the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spo-
ken in language that is clear and definite. We should not derive
criminal outlawry from some ambiguous implication."'
It would seem that the rule of lenity is in complete accord with
enforcement of the double jeopardy limitation. Nevertheless, the lower
federal courts have refused to apply the rule when the Supreme Court
has not already applied it to the particular statute in question, or when
the Supreme Court has implied the opposite result in a case under that
statute." 2  The use of the rule of lenity for double prosecution and
punishment of corporations and other large business forms is probably
precluded by decisions such as Coronado CoalF" which implemented
the Sherman Act's broad coverage. In the case of partnerships and
other small forms of businesses, where the congressional intent to pun-
ish both the individuals is not so clear, such a rule should be em-
ployed to counterbalance the rapidly increasing probability of multiple
punishment arising from overlapping or closely related offenses. The
rule would merely require that all doubts be resolved in favor of the de-
fendant, and would thus sufficiently individualize prosecutions under the
Sherman Act to reach just results. It would require the courts to dis-
tinguish carefully between manifest legislative intent and the exercise
of arbitrary judicial discretion. In the majority of cases, both the de-
fendant entity and the defendant individual could be prosecuted and
punished; thus the broad coverage of the Sherman Act would be pre-
served. In those unusual cases such as Western where it is not clear
that Congress intended that both the partnership and partner be pun-
ished, and where there is a substantial identity of the financial in-
terests of the partner and those of the partnership, the court would
109. 358 U.S. 169 (1958).
110. Id. at 177.
111. Id. at 177-78, quoting United States v. Universal CIT Credit Corp., 344
U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952) (emphasis added).
112. See, e.g., Carlson v. United States, 274 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1960).
113. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1921).
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uphold the defendant's double jeopardy claim. Although this would
limit the broad coverage of the Sherman Act slightly, it would preserve
the individual defendant's constitutional rights. This solution would
also place the entity concept in proper perspective as a fictional con-
cept. As in the case of workmen's compensation, the courts would
look through the entity veil whenever multiple punishment seems un-
warranted.
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